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Let us make no mistake about the scope of what we are doing
here today in adopting [the DMCA], about the tremendously
powerful new right to control access to information that we are
granting to information owners for the very first time. If left un-
qualified, this new right, as the Commerce Committee heard in
testimony from the public and private sectors alike, could well
prove to be the legal foundation for a society in which informa-
tion becomes available only on a 'pay-per-use' basis ...
Copyright law is not just about protecting information. It's just
as much about affording reasonable access to it as a means of
keeping our democracy healthy and doing what the Constitution
says copyright law is all about: promoting 'Progress in Science
and the useful Arts.' If this bill ceases to strike that balance, it
will no longer deserve Congress'or the public's support.'
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I. ONCE UPON A TIME, THERE WAS REAL PROPERTY...
The bundle of property rights that possessors of real property en-
joyed grew over time as the power of the government began to shrink.
Starting in 1066, the rights in real property were defined by a feudal re-
lationship or bargain-the Crown gave a tenant possession of the land,
and in return the tenant delivered military service (e.g. 2 knights per
year). The tenant did not have ownership; they were on the land with the
consent of the Crown (or an intermediary, like Baron de Ros2) and could
not transfer their real interest without penalty.
After more than 200 years, the 1290 Statute Quia Emptores allowed
"that shall be lawful for any free man to sell at will his lands or tene-
ments or a part of them" without paying a penalty to the Crown.3 The
long-term effect of the Statute Quia Emptores was that "[f]orms of [real]
property that required a feudal relationship between lord and tenant were
eliminated ... reduc[ing] feudal property to saleable forms .... The
statute helped enable the shift from feudalism to a monetary society.
Similarly, the bundle of copyright owners' property rights has in-
creased over time. The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."5 The public gets the rights to work once be-
yond copyright protection; in exchange, the author controls copying and
distribution of that work while protected. Alienability and heritability6 of
U.S. copyrights have never been an issue, but the duration of protection
2. Wikipedia, Baron de Ros, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baron deRos. (Baron de
Ros is the most ancient baronage of England, created in 1264, predating the Statute Quia
Emptores) (last visited March 17, 2007).
3. See Ernest F Henderson, Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages, pp. 14 9-
150 (George Bell & Sons 1910), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/sourceledl-
quia.html.
4. Joshua Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1047, 1071-72 (2005).
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Copyright Clause"). The Copyright Clause is also
known as the Intellectual Property Clause.
6. Heritability is defined " capable of being inherited." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 745
(8th ed. 2004).
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and other rights reserved to the public, particularly first use and fair use,
have changed over time.
In the last decade of the 20th Century, more than 200 years after the
first Copyright Act of 1790, the rights of copyright owners have in-
creased relative to those of the public. The Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990 provided a limited right to visual artists to control their work; even
after sold, limiting first use rights.7 The first copyright act had a 28 year
term; in 1998, the term of copyright was increased to the life of the au-
thor plus 70 years.8 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of
1998 dramatically shrank the fair use rights provided under 17 U.S.C
§ 107 for works with anti-circumvention provisions.
II. CONGRESSIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RATIONALE FOR THE DMCA
Congress intended to add a new right when they enacted 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(2) and (b). The Senate Judiciary Committee stated the two
sections "are designed to protect two distinct rights and to target two
distinct classes of devices." 9 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) protects access
which is distinct from the traditional copyright rights protected by 17
U.S.C. § 1201(b).'0 The Committee outlawed circumvention of access
controls as "roughly analogous to making it illegal to break into a house
using a tool, the primary purpose of which is to break into houses.""
Since controlling access to works is not one of the standard copyright
rights listed in 17 U.S.C. § 106, the DMCA grants a new right to copy-
right owners.' 2 The Senate report explains that "[t]he prohibition in
1201(a)(1) is necessary because prior to this Act, the conduct of circum-
vention [of access controls] was never before made unlawful."3 The
device limitation in 1201(a)(2) enforces this new prohibition on con-
duct." Since copyright law prohibits infringement, the device limitation
in 1201(b) is intended to enforce the longstanding prohibitions on in-
fringements.'5 To illustrate the difference between 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)
and (b), suppose a CD included software called "COPY PROTECT" that
ensured the CD, filled with copyrighted works, was not copied but did
7. Pub. L. No. 101-650 §§ 601-10 (1990).
8. Pub. L. No. 105-298 § 102 (1998), 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
9. S. Rep. No. 105-190 at 12 (1998).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 11.
12. See id. at 12.
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not control access to the works. COPY PROTECT could modify the CD
so it cannot play on a computer CD drive. Circumventing COPY
PROTECT would violate 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) which is tied to the tradi-
tional rights against copying in 17 U.S.C § 106(1) and distribution under
17 U.S.C. § 106(3).6 COPY PROTECT protects the copyright owner
from infringement, so 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) reinforces the existing prohi-
bitions against violating a copyright owner's rights. Now suppose the
same CD contained a second piece of software called "CONTROL
ACCESS". CONTROL ACCESS could protect the same CD filled with
copyrighted works from being accessed without preventing copying; for
example, by encrypting the works. Manufacturing, importing, offering to
the public, or providing a method for circumventing CONTROL
ACCESS would violate 17 U.S.C § 1201(a)(2).'
7
In a September 16, 1997 letter to Congress, 62 copyright scholars
expressed concern with the DMCA's expansion of copyright holders'
rights. They stated that "liability under the section [now 17 U.S.C.
1201(a)] would result from conduct separate and independent from any
act of copyright infringement or any intent to promote infringement."'9
They stated that the DMCA would "represent an unprecedented depar-
ture into the zone of what might be called paracopyright ... by
regulating conduct which traditionally has fallen outside the regulatory
sphere of intellectual property law."20 A working definition of a para-
copyright is any copyright-like right not specifically addressed by the
Copyright Clause. Congress can only provide a paracopyright by invok-
ing some additional Constitutional provision(s). To enact the DMCA's
paracopyright, Congress called on their powers under both the Copyright
and the Commerce Clauses."
A. The Commerce Clause and Paracopyright
Outside the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 1101 created a paracopyright to
prevent recording of live performances. Prior to the enactment of 17
U.S.C. § 1101, Dowling v. United States held that taping of live perform-




17. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006).
18. 144 CONG. REc. E2137 (1998).
19. Id.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. See id.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006).
23. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
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United States v. Moghadam directly addressed a Copyright Clause
challenge to the antibootlegging statute.24 The Moghadam Court as-
sumed "that the Copyright Clause could not sustain this legislation
because live performances, being unfixed, are not encompassed by the
term 'Writings' which includes a fixation requirement." Discussing the
relationship between the Commerce Clause and the Copyright Clause,
the Moghadam Court stated: "[T]he Supreme Court's analysis in the
Trade-Mark Cases stands for the proposition that legislation which
would not be permitted under the Copyright Clause could nonetheless be
permitted under the Commerce Clause, provided that the independent
requirements of the latter are met. 26
The Supreme Court recognizes "three general categories of regula-
tion in which Congress is authorized to engage under its commerce
power.'' These three categories are: (1) regulation of the channels of
interstate commerce, (2) regulation and protection of the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce
and (3) regulation of activities that substantially affect interstate com-
28
merce.
If a court followed Moghadam in allowing Congress to augment the
Copyright Clause powers with the Commerce Clause, then the access
control paracopyright granted 17 U.S.C. § 1201 would be Constitutional.
The Moghadam Court did not reach issues of limited duration or new
rights, which could be raised considering protection of public domain
works.29 However, in a footnote, the Moghadam court stated "[o]ur hold-
ing is limited to the fixation requirement, and should not be taken as
authority that the other various limitations in the Copyright Clause can
be avoided by reference to the Commerce Clause."3
The access prohibitions created by the DMCA are paracopyrights. A
U.S. District Court has held that "17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) of the DMCA was
within Congress' Commerce Power to enact, and because it is not
irreconcilably inconsistent with any provision of [Art 1. § 8, cl. 8], Con-
gress did not exceed its constitutional authority in enacting the law."'"
24. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). The specific
anti-bootlegging statute at issue was 18 U.S.C. 2318-19 which provides for criminal penalties
for bootlegging. Id. at n.4.
25. Id. at 1277.
26. Id. at 1278.
27. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005) (citations omitted).
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281.
30. Id. at 1281, n.14.
31. United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1141-42 (N.D. Cal 2002) (em-
phasis added).
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The Elcom court commented that the "DMCA does not allow a
copyright owner to effectively prevent [a work] from ever entering the
public domain, despite the expiration of the copyright. 32 The Elcom
court stated that "at best, the publisher has a technological measure em-
bedded within the digital product precluding certain uses of that
particular copy of the work."33 Further, "the user/purchaser has acqui-
esced in this restriction when purchasing/licensing the work."34 The
Elcom court concluded "None of [the 17 U.S.C § 106] rights is extended
beyond the statutory term merely by prohibiting the trafficking in or
marketing of devices primarily designed to circumvent use restrictions
on works in electronic form."35
Elcom's reasoning implies all items protected with anti-
circumvention technology are subject to a license or other contractual
agreement. Suppose a person buys a copy of an e-book whose contents
have passed into the public domain without signing an End User License
Agreement. Unlike Elcom, this person did not "acquiesc[e] in [a] restric-
tion when purchasing/licensing the work.' 36 But the person could not
buy, borrow or write software to freely access their own work, if that
software could access copyrighted e-books as well. Why? 17 U.S.C.
1201(a)(1) forbids providing such circumvention measures if they pro-
tect copyrighted works, even to one who could legitimately say "I will
swear in blood and in court my only use of your product is to access
public domain materials." This type of impermissible extension of copy-
right into the public domain was left unaddressed by the Elcom court.
III. FAIR USE-DMCA STYLE
Fair use under paracopyright "in reference to a range of consumer
interests in copyright ... [is] continued access, under reasonable terms,
to information governed by [a paracopyright] regime. 37 The Commerce
Clause's intrusion into Copyright concerns "reasonable terms."38 Techno-
logical circumvention of access controls may not directly infringe a
copyright. These protection provisions do not clearly define a method or





37. 144 CONG. Rac. E2137 (1998) (emphasis added).
38. Id.
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allowance for fair use.39 The fairness of a use often turns on the intent of
the alleged infringer.4°
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) is facially a strict liability statute that says "[n]o
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title."4' The authors of the DMCA
felt they were protecting fair uses when they allowed for exemptions for
libraries, reverse engineering, encryption research, allowing restrictions
on what minors see on the Internet, and security testing. 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 limits the infringement liability of internet service providers due to
the acts of their subscribers.4 ' Further, the DMCA required the Registrar
of Copyrights to inform Congress of the fair use needs for distance edu-
cation, which are now part of the Copyright Act.44 A provider of
"circumvention of technological measures" is strictly liable under 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a) or (b), unless the provider's activity is on the DMCA's
list of fair uses.4 ' As a practical matter, this means that the only uses of
materials subject to the DMCA are the uses allowed by the copyright
owner or specifically permitted by the Copyright Act.
The DMCA invokes 17 U.S.C. § 107 when it states "Nothing in this
section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations or defenses to copyright
infringement, including fair use, under this title."46 The DMCA appears
to have betrayed the spirit of 17 U.S.C. § 107. The intent of 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 was to codify common law exceptions to copyright infringement
based on equity.4 7 17 U.S.C. § 107 determines if a use is fair (as opposed
to copyright infringement) based on the purpose and the character of the
use, nature of the work, amount of the work copied, and effect on the
market.4'8 Balancing these factors indicates that the copyright holder must
suffer an actual harm before denying the fair use defense. 49 However, the
structure and wording of the DMCA seem to indicate that fair use must
be pigeonholed into a safe harbor against the presumption that copyright
39. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)-(b).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) ("the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.").
41. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d), (-(h), (j) (2006).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
44. 17 U.S.C § 110(2) (2006).
45. See 321 Studio v. MGM Studios, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (9th Cir. 2000).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2006).
47. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), available at http://www.titlel7.coml
contentLegMat/houseReport/chpt01/sec107.html.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
49. Id.
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holders control rights for any use of the work, especially if a "techno-
logical measure had been violated."5 °
A. DMCA Fair Use Hypothetical
The following hypothetical illustrates the bounds between fair use
and the DMCA:
Carla Counselor, renowned copyright attorney, does some amazing
work for Doubleday on The Da Vinci Code in copyrighting the book,
illustrated versions, CD's, video games, etc. including the legal work
behind setting up an e-book website for them. Tripleday Publishing,
planning to do something similar for their new book "The Michelangelo
Method", asks her to tell them about her firm's legal services.
Carla prepares a roughly 100 page presentation, all on paper, with
two pages from the 480 page The Da Vinci Factor: Special Illustrated
Edition. One page consists of text describing the Louvre at night and the
second shows a corresponding photo of the Louvre. Tripleday requests
an electronic version of her slides. Carla agrees.
Instead of just scanning her slides, she decides to use Doubleday's
new e-book website (after all, she helped create it). Carla buys the e-
book version of The Da Vinci Factor.: Special Illustrated Edition, "flips"
to the page she wants to use, and tries to cut/paste the text into her slide.
To protect against unauthorized copying, Doubleday's software does not
allow her to download an entire copy of the book or to cut/paste either
the text or the image she wanted. Frustrated, Carla surfs the web. She
finds that Screengrab, written by Andy Mullen, might help her out. After
all, "Screengrab saves entire web pages as images."' She uses Screen-
grab to duplicate the two pages of the e-book she needs for Tripleday,
adds those two pages to the rest of the presentation, and e-mails it to Tri-
pleday. Tripleday loves her presentation and gives her firm all of their
copyright work. In gratitude to Andy Mullen, Carla sends him $20 for
providing Screengrab. Doubleday becomes angry when it learns that
Carla used their work in any fashion to help their competitor and sues
Carla. After discovery, Doubleday adds Andy Mullen to the suit.
1. Question 1: Is the Original Paper Version of the Presentation
a Fair Use Under 17 U.S.C. § 107?
Under 17 U.S.C. § 107, the four fair use factors generally weigh in
her favor.5 2 Factor 1, the nature of the use, weighs against Carla as a
50. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)-(b) (2006).
51. Mozilla, Screengrab!::Firefox Add-ons, https://addons.mozilla.orglen-US/firefox/
addonl1 146 (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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commercial use. The unfairness of her commercial use is likely exceeded
by the transformative nature of her use.53 Factor 2, the nature of the
copyrighted work, weighs against Carla as the work is creative. 4 Factor
3, the amount/substance of the work used is in Carla's favor, as she used
about 0.5% of the book.5 Factor 4, the effect on the work's market,
weighs in Carla's favor since her presentation has no obvious effect on
the market for The Da Vinci Code.
56
2. Question 2: Is Carla in Violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)?
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) states that "No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work pro-
tected under this title. 57 The Da Vinci Code is copyrighted and protected
under the Copyright Act." The issue is if Carla "circumvented the access
controls" provided by the website by using Screengrab to get the text
and image from Doubleday. 9
First, does it matter that her use was likely a fair use under 17 U.S.C.
§ 107? If a court believed that access control is a right distinct from
copyright infringement, then it may read 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) as only
preserving Carla's defenses to copyright infringement. The plain reading
of the statute does not say that fair use is a defense to circumvention of
access controls. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) states that "Nothing in this section
shall affect ... defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,
under this title."6
Doubleday is pursuing remedies for circumvention of access con-
trols, not copyright infringement. Doubleday could claim the market for
cut/paste access to their works, which they could separately market as a
"premium" feature, would be adversely affected by uses such as Carla's.
The claimed presence of a premium feature market could undermine
Carla's fair use defense by tilting the market effect fair use factor against
her.6'
53. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569,584-85,591 (1994).
54. See id. at 586.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 590-91.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l).
58. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2006) (emphasis added). See also Universal City Studios v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2nd Cir. 2001) ("[T]he DMCA targets the circumvention of digital
walls guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking in circumvention tools), but does not
concern itself with the use of those materials after circumvention has occurred.").
61. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996) (market creation for licensing photocopied works leads to finding against fair use for
photocopy shop owner).
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One question is if the lack of a cut/paste function on the website was
an effective access control under the statute. Carla could argue it was a
bug in the design of the website since many web pages allow cut and
paste access to their text at least. Carla could also argue that, by display-
ing the text on a screen with knowledge of the existence of tools like
Screengrab, Doubleday effectively provided no protection to the work.
Doubleday could counter with the argument that they had designed the
web page without cut/paste control intentionally to control access to
copying their works. Doubleday could argue that Carla had to resort to a
separate piece of software to gain access. Without Screengrab or similar
software, Doubleday's failure to provide cut/paste access would be an
effective control over the work.
The issue would likely depend on the court's interpretation of
cut/paste access and if Doubleday's lack of support for cut/paste acts as
an effective access control, and if any user agreement Carla affirmed
covered access rights. 62 The Lexmark court recognized that 17 U.S.C.
1201(a)(3) requires the application of a process to gain access to the
work and not to "restric[t] one form of access but leav[e] another route
wide open. 63 If a court decided lack of cut/paste support was intentional,
Screengrab may be an illegal "means ... to avoid ... a technological
measure, without the authority of the copyright owner" to access the e-
book . Any user agreements Carla made may be taken into account-she
may have waived any fair use rights she had.65
3. Question 3: Is Carla in Violation of 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(2)?
If Carla is found in violation of 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1), then since she
sent $20 to Andy, she may have "trafficked" in access control technol-
ogy. Since Andy likely did not violate 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(2) by providing
Screengrab (see Question 4 below), Carla likely did not violate 17
U.S.C. 1201(a) by sending Andy $20 for Screengrab.
4. Question 4: Is Andy in Violation of 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(2) or 17 U.S.C § 1201(b)?
Andy is probably not in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) or 17
U.S.C. § 1201(b), as Screengrab and other tools have other uses and
were in existence (collectively) before Doubleday's e-book website.
Andy may argue that Screengrab did not violate 17 U.S.C.
62. See Lexmark Int'l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 546-47
(6th Cir. 2004) (discussion on how effective access controls must be under DMCA).
63. Id.
64. 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(3)(A).
65. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining ability of
end users to waive rights under contract).
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1201(a)(2)(A), as it was not primarily designed or produced for the pur-
pose of circumventing access controls. Andy could argue Screengrab
was not designed to circumvent access controls that did not yet exist.
Doubleday could counter that Andy's purpose was to duplicate screen
content from a web browser, Doubleday's work along with many other
copyrighted works are displayed on a web browser, and so Screengrab
was intentionally designed to circumvent Doubleday's access controls.
Andy could also argue that 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(2)(B) was not violated
since Screengrab has many other significant uses other than circumven-
tion of access controls (for example, providing web designers,
photographers, and other visual artists a way to create portfolios). Also
he could argue that 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(2)(C) was not violated, as Screen-
grab was not marketed with the anticipation of violating access controls.
Finally, Andy asked for donations, not payment.66
If Carla's use was fair (as it would likely be, unless there was a true
market concern), then Andy would not be liable under 17 U.S.C
§ 1201(b) as Screengrab did not then violate a copyright right, has other
significant purposes, and was not marketed to infringe copyrights.67
IV. ANOTHER VIEW OF FAIR USES-ACTIVE COPYRIGHT CONSUMERS
Joseph Liu characterized copyright works consumers on a spec-
trum."' On one end are passive copyright consumers who do no more
than consume the work (a.k.a. couch potatoes).69 On the other end of the
spectrum are "authors" who create new and/or derivative works based on
their experiences with the copyrighted work.70 In the middle of these ex-
tremes, Liu characterizes people as active copyright consumers
exercising their "autonomy, communication, and creative self-
expression" interests.
7'
The interests of active copyright consumers center around "auton-
omy." An autonomous use is the right to control one's use of the work in
a different fashion than the author intended.72 Autonomy interests cover
the ability to use the work when, where, and how the owner would like.73
66. Andy Mutton, Step 3: Profit!, http:/andy.5263.orglarchives/2005/09/21/step-3-
profit/#more-52 (Sept. 21, 2005 entry) (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
68. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. Rev 397, 402-
405 (2003).
69. Id. at 402.
70. Id. at 405.
71. Id. at 406.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 407.
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Many fundamental autonomous uses are customarily protected by
copyright law. A basic autonomous use is skipping to the end of a book
or movie.74 Another autonomous use is the first sale doctrine-the right
to sell a legitimate copy of a work.75 The private performance right to
show the work to a few people in a private setting is also an autonomous
76use.
Active copyright consumers use works in their own acts of creative
self-expression that may be less than authorship of a new work. Active
copyright consumers may comment on the work, including retelling the
story in one's own language, criticism of the work, and writing notes in
the margins about the work. This right is preserved under 17 U.S.C.
§ 107, which allows "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ..
scholarship, and research" as legitimate fair uses.77 The commentary in-
terest is evidenced in web logs or blogs, for short. One definition of a
blog is "[a] frequent, chronological publication of personal thoughts and
Web links. '78 Blogs cover the spectrum of human interests.79 In the digi-
tal realm, it is legal to make digital files of one's own CDsY Making
personal copies can run afoul of the copyright owner's right to control
distribution of their work. Uploading and distributing digital files made
from copyrighted works is not legal, even if there is a transformation
from the original work to the digital format.8
When the creative self-expression turns into "macro-authorship" of a
derivative work, the derivative work doctrine applies.82 One common
method of creative self-expression is to create a mix tape, CD, or play
list of favorite or expressive music." Another creative use of copyrighted
works is recasting of copyrighted works in new creations--children's
drawings of Batman, using snippets of poems in personal writings, and
fan fiction. 8These works are typically legal today as fair uses. The real
74. Id. at 406.
75. Id. at 407.
76. Id. at 408.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
78. Dept. of Management, Marketing, and International Business, College of Business
Administration, University of Texas-Pan American, http://www.baclass.panam.edu/mana3333/
glossary/chapter02.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
79. For a small sample of interests covered by blogs, see Blog-City, http://wwwl.blog-
city.com/community/category/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
80. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th
Cir. 1999).
81. UMG Recordings v. Mp3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
82. Liu, supra note 68, at 417-18.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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and tenuous protection for "micro-authorship" uses may be the forbear-
ance of the copyright owner.
When active copyright consumer uses another's copyrighted works
to create their own, they may cross from micro-authorship to creation of
a derivative work. In Micro Star v. Formgen, the defendant sold new
game scenarios using plaintiff's copyrighted game engine and library of
art.86 The Micro Star Court held creation of new game scenarios was a
derivative work, since the defendant's scenarios were sequels "telling
new ... tales of Duke's fabulous adventures".87 The DMCA wants fair
use "at reasonable terms."88 The strictness and the complexity of the law
will not necessarily ensure compliance. This arrangement will work only
if the market provides suitable alternatives to copyright infringement.
Technology may prevent or hinder legitimate uses, and technological
solutions are potentially invasive of privacy.90 The markets often are slow
to provide usable technological (if not legal) alternatives to piracy, such
as the delay in providing commercial downloadable music.9 ' This array
of public interests, particularly those of active copyright consumers, is
not well served.
V. WWMD-WHAT WOULD MADISON Do?
I believe that fair use should be considered an affirmative right
under the 1976 Act, rather than merely an affirmative defense, as
it is defined in the Act as a use that is not a violation of copy-
right.... [T]he fact that the fair use right must be procedurally
asserted as an affirmative defense does not detract from its con-
stitutional significance as a guarantor to access and use for First
12Amendment purposes.
85. See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F3d. 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1998) (artist claimed if a post-
card purchaser jotted a note on a postcard, used it as a coaster, or cut it in half, such "changes
prepare derivative works, but that as a practical matter artists would not file suit").
86. Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998).
87. Id. atlI112.
88. 144 CONG. REC. E2137 (1998) (remarks of Rep. Bliley).
89. Id.
90. Hiawatha Bray, Security Firm: Sony CDs Secretly Install Spyware, Boston Globe,
Nov. 8, 2005, at DI (available at http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/
2005/11/08/security.firmsonyscds.secretly-install-spyware/).
91. Mark Cooper, Consumer Federation of America, Time for the Recording Industry to
Face the Music: the Political, Social and Economic Benefits of Peer-To-Peer
Communications Networks 5 (2005) (available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/
PEERtoPEERISSUEBRIEF.pdf).
92. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(Birch J.).
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The Second Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1791 "to imple-
ment the three copyright policies inherited from the Statute of Anne-
the promotion of learning, the right of public access, and the protection
of the public domain-and included in the Copyright Clause."93 The
DMCA's creation of a paracopyright adversely affects the last two of
these historical copyright policies. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) and (b) limit
public access to works effectively controlled by anti-circumvention
measures. 94 The public domain is constrained without limiting the time
anti-circumvention measures are allowed to protect a work.95 The public
domain is further restrained when anti-circumvention measures protect
both copyrighted and public domain materials, as the DMCA does not
distinguish between protections for copyrighted and public domain
works.96 Active copyright consumers' rights may be protected more by
copyright owners' restraint or a limitation of DRM technology than as a
function of law.
When a government of the people specifies new rights, the governed
often want to ensure they have their basic rights specified. "When a new
Federal Constitution was proposed in 1787, the most powerful objection
leveled against it was that it lacked a bill of rights., 97 When drafting the
Bill of Rights, Madison identified two categories of rights: (1) natural
rights, or "those... which are retained when particular powers are given
up to be exercised by the legislature"; and (2) positive rights, such as
trial by jury, which were equally "essential to secure the liberty of the
people." 98 Many of the rights protected by the Bill of Rights are positive
rights.
A copyright consumer does not currently have a natural or positive
right to fair use; instead fair use is an affirmative defense under 17
U.S.C. § 107. Under the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) specifically pro-
vides for fair use. 99 Fair use should be retained even when Congress
exercises its powers to regulate commerce, copyright, and the public
93. L. Ray Patterson, An Essay Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyright Power
Granted to Congress in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J.
909, 945 (2003).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b).
95. See id.
96. See id. For example, it appears that the DMCA would prevent anti-circumvention
measures being applied to a CD containing copies of Mozart's original sheet music, which is
in the public domain, as long as it had copyrightable material, such as a brief description of
Mozart's works.
97. Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Lim-
its of the Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U.L. REV. 1275, 1288 (1998).
98. Id. at 1290.
99. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 1201(c).
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domain. Under the current legal scheme, fair use is subject to erosion
when laws and markets change. '0
Fair use should be a positive paracopyright supported by both the
First Amendment and the Copyright Clause. As Judge Birch indicated,
fair use has "constitutional significance as a guarantor to access and use
for First Amendment purposes."' ' A "Bill of Fair Use Rights" may in-
clude at least:
* The right to use at least a de minimis amount of all media for
personal or commercial use, particularly commentary.102
" The first sale right should extend to all media regardless of
contractual terms. An allied right is making complete copies
of media for personal use, such as mix tapes, and disaster re-
covery. To ensure the rights of copyright holders, personal
copies could not be sold and must be destroyed upon first
sale.
* The making of micro-authored works, such as annotated cop-
ies of books, music, and video, should be protected for
personal use. This right would also allow creation of software
to help users create micro-authored works. If micro-authored
works were sold, the creation software was used to copy
copyrighted works, or micro-authored works evolved into de-
rivative works, there would be a violation of copyright law.
" Explicitly permit circumvention and copying of media that
contained public domain or unprotected materials to fight
copyright misuse. This would protect only digital media that
contained copyrighted materials. This right would uphold the
Lexmark Court's finding that "fair use doctrine preserves pub-
lic access to the ideas and functional elements embedded in
copyrighted computer software programs."'0 3
" Create a "copyright consumer's voice;" for example, a per-
manent committee of people unaligned with the copyright
industries to represent the public's right to fair uses.
100. Basic Books Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1534 (S.D.N.Y
1991) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985)) ("To negate fair use, one need only
show that if the challenged use should become widespread, it would adversely affect the po-
tential market for the copyrighted work.").
101. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (I Ith Cir. 2001).
102. This would overturn Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir.
2005) (de minimis sampling of a sound recording not permitted).
103. Lexmark Int'l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537 (6th Cir.
2004).
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When markets change or other new paracopyrights are enacted, a
thoughtful balance between specified fair uses and market realities could
be reached by comparing the market need or paracopyright to the fair
use rights. This balancing would promote copyright's policies of ensur-
ing public access, maintaining the public domain, and protecting the
rights of authors by giving all three goals positive rights.
